The authors propose that self-control involves making decisions and behaving in a manner consistent with high-level versus low-level construals of a situation. Activation of high-level construals (which capture global, superordinate, primary features of an event) should lead to greater self-control than activation of low-level construals (which capture local, subordinate, secondary features). In 6 experiments using 3 different techniques, the authors manipulated construal levels and assessed their effects on self-control and underlying psychological processes. High-level construals led to decreased preferences for immediate over delayed outcomes, greater physical endurance, stronger intentions to exert self-control, and less positive evaluations of temptations that undermine self-control. These results support a construal-level analysis of self-control. Entitativity perception refers to the perception of a collection of individuals as a group. The authors propose 2 perceptual-inferential bases of entitativity perception. First, perceivers would expect a collection of individuals with similar physical traits to possess common psychological traits. Second, perceivers watching a group of individuals engage in concerted behavior would infer that these individuals have common goals. Thus, both similarity in physical traits (e.g., same skin color) and concerted collective behavior (e.g., same movement) would evoke perception of group entitativity. Results from 5 experiments show that same group movement invariably leads to common goal inferences, increased perceived cohesiveness, and increased perceived entitativity. Moreover, same skin color evokes inferences of group traits and increases perceived homogeneity and perceived entitativity but only when skin color is diagnostic of group membership. In 5 experiments, college students exhibited a group size effect on risk judgments. As the number of individuals in a target group increased, so did participants' judgments of the risk of the average member of the group for a variety of negative life events. This happened regardless of whether the stimuli consisted of photographs of real peers or stick-figure representations of peers. As a result, the degree to which participants exhibited comparative optimism (i.e., judged themselves to be at lower risk than their peers) also increased as the size of the comparison group increased. These results suggest that the typical comparative optimism effect reported so often in the literature might be, at least in part, a group size effect. Additional results include a group size effect on judgments of the likelihood that the average group member will experience positive and neutral events and a group size effect on perceptual judgments of the heights of stick figures. These latter results, in particular, support the existence of a simple, general cognitive mechanism that integrates stimulus numerosity into quantitative judgments about that stimulus. 
In 5 experiments, college students exhibited a group size effect on risk judgments. As the number of individuals in a target group increased, so did participants' judgments of the risk of the average member of the group for a variety of negative life events. This happened regardless of whether the stimuli consisted of photographs of real peers or stick-figure representations of peers. As a result, the degree to which participants exhibited comparative optimism (i.e., judged themselves to be at lower risk than their peers) also increased as the size of the comparison group increased. These results suggest that the typical comparative optimism effect reported so often in the literature might be, at least in part, a group size effect. Additional results include a group size effect on judgments of the likelihood that the average group member will experience positive and neutral events and a group size effect on perceptual judgments of the heights of stick figures. These latter results, in particular, support the existence of a simple, general cognitive mechanism that integrates stimulus numerosity into quantitative judgments about that stimulus. The authors investigated the role of dissimilarity on context effects in person perception. Most research predicts similar people to be similarly evaluated and different people to be contrasted with each other. However, some research suggests that similarity may enhance comparison and contrast. To explain these opposite effects, the authors argue that dissimilarity may influence 2 different processes with opposite consequences. Dissimilarity may decrease common categorization and thus the likelihood of comparison, resulting in reduced contrast, whereas during comparison itself dissimilarity may increase the perceived dissimilarity of features and thereby increase contrast. To investigate this, the authors conducted 3 studies in which they manipulated dissimilarity by inserting morphs that were related or unrelated to the context and target faces before judgments were made. The results indicate that dissimilarity may affect the likelihood and the outcome of comparison, with contrasting consequences. Teasing is ambiguous. Although the literal content of a tease is, by definition, negative, seldom do teasers intend for their tease to be taken literally. Toward this aim, teasers often attempt to mitigate the negative surface content of the tease by communicating via gesture, facial expression, or tone of voice that they are "just kidding." The research presented here suggests that such attempts often fall on deaf ears. Despite teasers' attempts to mitigate the tease, targets are often unaware of--and unmoved by--the teaser's benign intentions. As a result, teasers and targets systematically differ in their perceptions of teasing: Although it is often seen as innocent and playful by the teaser, it tends to be construed as considerably more malicious by the target. Four experiments examined whether group formation and positive in-group regard require interaggregate comparison as the in-group-requires-an-out-group assumption of the metacontrast principle implies. The authors fostered novel social aggregates with or without a contrasting aggregate with which members could compare and varied intra-aggregate factors (interaction or interdependence). Regardless of whether interaggregate comparison was feasible, the intra-aggregate factors increased the perceived entitativity of the aggregate and positive regard toward the aggregate (i.e., social attraction and cooperation among members). Mediation analyses were consistent with the possibility that the intra-aggregate factors promoted entitativity, which in turn promoted in-group regard. These data suggest that group formation and in-group regard have intragroup origins and do not require comparison with a contrasting social aggregate. Modeling research that has focused on the effects of observing similar others appears to have underestimated the influence of observing dissimilar others. Two experiments demonstrated that observing a model express liking for a piece of music induced more favorable opinions of the music (positive modeling) when the model was similar to the participant observer in relevant opinions, and more negative opinions (negative modeling) when the model was dissimilar to the participant in relevant opinions. Of note, this pattern was more pronounced when participants also believed their general backgrounds were dissimilar rather than similar to that of the model. White Americans tend to believe that there has been greater progress toward racial equality than do Black Americans. The authors explain this difference by combining insights from prospect theory and social dominance theory. According to prospect theory, changes seem greater when framed as losses rather than gains. Social dominance theory predicts that White Americans tend to view increases in equality as losses, whereas Black Americans view them as gains. In Studies 1 and 2, the authors experimentally tested whether groups judge the same change differently depending on whether it represents a loss or gain. In Studies 3-6, the authors used experimental methods to test whether White participants who frame equality-promoting changes as losses perceive greater progress toward racial equality. The authors discuss theoretical and political implications for progress toward a just society. Are there sex differences in criteria for sexual relationships? The answer depends on what question a researcher asks. Data suggest that, whereas the sexes differ in whether they will enter short-term sexual relationships, they are more similar in what they prioritize in partners for such relationships. However, additional data and context of other findings and theory suggest different underlying reasons. In Studies 1 and 2, men and women were given varying "mate budgets" to design short-term mates and were asked whether they would actually mate with constructed partners. Study 3 used a mate-screening paradigm. Whereas women have been found to prioritize status in long-term mates, they instead (like men) prioritize physical attractiveness much like an economic necessity in short-term mates. Both sexes also show evidence of favoring well-rounded long-and short-term mates when given the chance. In Studies 4 and 5, participants report reasons for having casual sex and what they find physically attractive. For women, results generally support a good genes account of short-term mating, as per strategic pluralism theory (S. W. Gangestad & J. A. Simpson, 2000) . Discussion addresses broader theoretical implications for mate preference, and the link between method and theory in examining social decision processes. 
